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Available online 2 June 2005Koppel et als recent report on computerized physi-
cian order entry (CPOE) evaluated its role in facilitating
medication errors [1]. Such studies are important be-
cause they can inform us regarding how to improve
technologies like CPOE. This evaluation is also valuable
because the authors studied a vendor-built product, and
vendor-developed applications are the predominant type
used in the U.S. today. To date, many of the studies of
CPOE have been done in organizations like Wishard
Memorial and Brigham and Womens Hospital, with
‘‘home-grown’’ applications [2–4]. The performance
characteristics of these home-grown applications may
be diﬀerent from vendor systems in domains such as
medication safety. This is both because the decision sup-
port has been improved over years in these institutions,
and because the software has been targeted to the work-
ﬂow in the individual institution, although the extent to
which these represent an issue is uncertain.
A main limitation of Koppel et als study is that it did
not count errors or adverse events, but instead measured
only perceptions of errors, which may or may not corre-
late with actual error rates. Further, it did not count the
errors that were prevented. As such, it oﬀers no insight
into whether the error rate was higher or lower with
CPOE. Unfortunately, however, the press interpreted
the study as suggesting that CPOE increases the medica-
tion error rate. While the authors did not state this, a
press release put out by JAMA did so.
In their paper, Koppel et al. were critical of other
studies for ‘‘focusing only on its advantages.’’ In fact,
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E-mail address: dbates@partners.org.Womens Hospital counted all the errors, both those
caused by CPOE, and those prevented, and found that
the net was a more than 80% decrease [3,4]. We also
reported errors that were caused by CPOE, notably
errors in potassium chloride ordering, but also other
errors [3,4]. This area has recently been reviewed [5,6]
and many recent studies have demonstrated large reduc-
tions in medication error rates, mostly in pediatrics
[5–11]. In fact, all the published studies of which we are
aware in which medication error rates were measured
have found rate reductions with introduction of CPOE.
The situation is much less clear for preventable adverse
drug events, in part because studies to date have lacked
suﬃcient power to detect even important diﬀerences.
The authors assert that there is no reason to believe
that the CPOE application they studied is worse than
any other. In fact, there are a lot of reasons to believe
that—the CPOE application the authors studied is a
very old application that requires multiple screens for
many activities, a limitation that caused some of the
problems identiﬁed. The authors own institution has
since moved toward implementing a much newer version
of the software, which was not mentioned in the article.
Most new software works better than old software.
Unfortunately, the healthcare industry continues to
use a great deal of outdated software. Koppel et al. have
conducted another similar study with the newer soft-
ware, and the results will be of interest.
However, newer software will not resolve all the issues
noted. Many of the issues mentioned by the providers
have little to do with the software, and much to do with
changing the medication use process. As one example,
their institution should have ﬁxed the incorrect doses
the authors identiﬁed. Any organization implementing
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cess after implementation. We identiﬁed many of the
problems the authors noted years ago, and nursing, phar-
macy, and physicians worked together to address them.
After implementing CPOE, we routinely tracked errors
and problems that were created, and made thousands
of changes to the original application. If I had one thing
to ‘‘do over’’ in our CPOE implementation, it would be
to have devoted more resources to this area—it is just
impossible to ‘‘get it all right’’ at the outset, because
the processes involved are so complex.
In the accompanying editorial, Wears and Berg sug-
gest that information technology in healthcare has not
delivered on its promise because more attention to so-
cio-technical issues is needed; clearly these issues need
to be better addressed. But in many respects they over-
state their case. For example, they assert that 75% of
all large projects in healthcare IT failed [12]. However,
on closer examination, the original citation for this
statement is a 1993 discussion paper published in the
Oxford Institute of Information management, and it
seems uncertain that this assertion is still true given
the changes since that time such as the blossoming of
the Web. They suggest the current situation is ‘‘waiting
for Godot,’’ implying that IT will never have an impact.
But I believe that is far too gloomy a perspective. Simi-
lar reservations were raised when other technologies
including the stethoscope were introduced.
Healthcare needs to change, and as the Institute of
Medicine has suggested, one of the keys to improving
safety and quality will be greater and more eﬀective
use of information technology [13]. Healthcare has long
under-invested in HIT relative to other industries [14].
Wears and Berg are correct that HIT is only a tool,
and that for it to have the desired impact socio-technical
factors must be considered and addressed. But HIT is an
extraordinarily powerful tool that should not be under-
estimated—to just give one example, the gains that are
possible today with forcing functions that require, for
instance, all the key ﬁelds in a prescription, and suggest
the right dose for a patient simply cannot be realized
with paper [4].
Koppel et als paper generated a tremendous amount
of attention and discussion within the informatics com-
munity. Most of the reactions were that the issues that
the authors identiﬁed were already well known to those
working in this area [15], and that the application being
evaluated represented very old software with a long his-
tory. The Technicon System was originally developed at
the Mayo Clinic in the 1960s by Lockheed, but was
‘‘judged too tedious for practical use.’’ [16] Mayo wrote
oﬀ tens of millions of dollars and went back to paper. It
was then brought to El Camino Hospital in the 1970s,
where it evolved further and was a success, at least for
its time. While it has been updated since that time, many
of the problems noted by the authors are likely stillpresent because the software was written so long ago.
But the overriding concern of the informatics communi-
ty was that this report would slow the move toward in-
creased use of IT in hospitals in the US, and in
particular, the adoption of CPOE. Nearly, everyone
agreed that the authors main point—that when a new
technology is introduced, it must be aggressively moni-
tored and ﬁxed—is essential. But many feared, especially
given the press response to this report that the adoption
rate will decline.
We do need to learn how well the diﬀerent CPOE sys-
tems perform, and in particular how well they perform
with respect to medication safety. To this end, the Leap-
frog Group has developed a test—which will be released
later this year—that hospitals can run on their decision
support capabilities, to provide at least a rough assess-
ment of whether their CPOE application has the needed
decision support. We will also need additional studies
such as Koppels, and also quantitative studies assessing
the impact of CPOE, especially in small hospitals.
CPOE represents a transformative technology. It has
many beneﬁts beyond medication safety. Saying that
‘‘CPOE causes medication errors’’ is like saying that
‘‘cars cause accidents.’’ Of course CPOE can cause med-
ication errors. Clearly, we should strive to make it work
better. Accident rates were high with cars early after
their introduction, but few today want to go back to
the horse and buggy. CPOE is here to stay, and it is
vastly better than paper.References
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